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A B S T R A C T
Despite evidence suggesting that specialised knowledge should be more relevant than generic knowledge
to explain different levels of audit quality across individual auditors, no study to date has addressed the
respective impacts of the industry-specific and the generic audit experience of audit partners on the quality
of audit services. Our study investigates this issue in the Spanish audit market. We proxy audit quality
by discretionary accruals and by the opinion of the audit report, and differentiate among client-specific
experience, industry-specific experience and generic audit experience of individual auditors. As expected,
our results show significantly higher audit quality when the client is audited by a partner with stronger
industry-specific audit experience. Furthermore, we observe that neither client-specific experience nor gen-
eric audit experience of audit partners are significant determinants of the quality of audit services provided
by these auditors. These results may have some interesting implications for audit firms. Therefore, whereas
some prior studies on the related issue of industry specialization point out that specialised knowledge is
more relevant than generic knowledge to explain the quality of audit services, our findings suggest that
specialised knowledge is, in fact, the only type of knowledge that seems to matter.
©2020 ASEPUC. Published by EDITUM - Universidad de Murcia. This is an open access article under the
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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R E S U M E N
A pesar de la evidencia que sugiere que el conocimiento especializado debería resultar más relevante que
el genérico para explicar diferentes niveles de calidad de auditoría asociados a los auditores individuales,
ningún estudio hasta la fecha ha abordado el posible impacto diferencial de la experiencia genérica
y específica en la calidad de los servicios de auditoría. Nuestro estudio investiga esta cuestión en el
mercado de auditoría español. Aproximamos la calidad de la auditoría a partir de los ajustes de devengo
discrecionales y la opinión del informe de auditoría; diferenciando entre experiencia específica con el
propio cliente, experiencia sectorial y experiencia de auditoría genérica. Como se esperaba, los resultados
muestran una mayor calidad de auditoría cuando el cliente es auditado por un socio con mayor experiencia
en el sector de actividad del cliente. También observamos que ni la experiencia específica con el propio
cliente, ni la experiencia genérica de auditoría del socio auditor son determinantes significativos de
la calidad de los servicios de auditoría. Por otro lado, mientras que algunos estudios previos señalan
que el conocimiento especializado resulta más relevante que el genérico para explicar la calidad de los
servicios de auditoría, este trabajo sugiere que el conocimiento especializado es, de hecho, el único tipo
de conocimiento que resulta relevante. Estos resultados pueden tener implicaciones interesantes para las
firmas de auditoría.
©2020 ASEPUC. Publicado por EDITUM - Universidad de Murcia. Este es un artículo Open Access bajo la
licencia CC BY-NC-ND (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
The link between the audit experience of individual audit-
ors and the quality of audit services provided by these aud-
itors relies on the concept of expertise. Frensch & Sternberg
(1989, p. 158) define expertise as: “an ability acquired by
practice to perform qualitatively well in a particular domain”.
In the auditing profession, the idea of “performing qualitat-
ively well” is associated with the quality of audit services.
Accordingly, expert auditors are expected to provide high-
quality audit services to their clients. Practical experience
is generally regarded as a necessary input for the acquisition
of knowledge (Libby & Luft, 1993). This is very explicit in
Frensch & Sternberg’s (1989) definition, when they refer to
“acquired by practice”. Therefore, if experience is a driver
of expertise, we may wonder whether different types of ex-
perience could have different contributions to the creation of
expertise.
The learning literature suggests that we may expect a dif-
ferential impact of industry-specific and generic audit experi-
ence on the quality of audit services. As noted by Schilling et
al. (2003), among others, learning curves used by psycholo-
gists to capture individual learning have reinforced the infer-
ence that learning is maximized through specialisation. Chi
et al. (1982) and Glaser & Chi (1988) stress the importance
of domain-specific knowledge for the building up of expertise.
Therefore, while it is widely accepted that specialised know-
ledge creates expertise, a much less empirically investigated
issue is the potential contribution of generic knowledge. In
this vein, Lapre et al. (2000) argue that experience gained in
some types of projects could have no effects or even impede
the learning process. Later on, Schilling et al. (2003) provide
an interesting analysis of how related and unrelated task vari-
ation contribute to expertise by improving the learning rate.
According to the authors, although both specialisation and
task variety are relevant factors to explain productivity, the
existing literature has yet to provide either explicit theoret-
ical arguments or empirical evidence of their respective im-
pacts on the learning-curve rate. Moreover, despite the com-
monly acknowledged efficiency advantages of specialisation,
some papers on organizational learning have also examined
the role of product or process variety (Fisher & Ittner, 1999).
It is worth mentioning Ellis’ (1965) understanding of “learn-
ing to learn” in which he argues that the process of learning to
learn implies that absorptive capacity may be improved even
when the knowledge base possessed is not directly related
to the knowledge base being acquired. Therefore, learning
skills may be transferred across fields of knowledge that are
organised or described in similar ways, even when the con-
tent of the knowledge is substantively different (i.e. clients
belonging to different industries).
Focusing on the auditing literature, several studies have ad-
dressed the importance of the industry specialisation of audit
firms (e.g. Ferguson et al., 2003; Kwon et al., 2007; Numan
& Willekens, 2012) and of audit partners (Chi & Chin, 2011;
Chin & Chi, 2009; Garcia-Blandon & Argiles-Bosch, 2018;
Goodwin & Wu, 2014; Zerni, 2012) as drivers of the qual-
ity of audit services. Accordingly, if specialised and generic
knowledge are expected to contribute differently to the build-
ing up of expertise, the distinction between industry-specific
and generic audit experience becomes relevant.
This study is motivated by the growing attention in the lit-
erature about the role and characteristics of audit partners
to explain the quality of audit services. Bedard (2012) ar-
gues that the interest of scholars in this issue is a natural
step in a progression from global audit firm networks to
local offices. According to Knechel (2000), audit quality ulti-
mately depends on the individual auditor judgments. Simil-
arly, some authors point out the relevance of some personal
characteristics of individual auditors (i.e. audit style, educa-
tional background and prior experience in large international
audit firms) as determinants for the quality of audit services
(e.g. Gul, Wu & Yang, 2013; Knechel et al., 2015). How-
ever, this interest goes beyond the confines of academia, since
many countries (including the US and EUmember states) cur-
rently require the mandatory rotation of the audit partner
after a specified number of years auditing a client. In May
2016, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ad-
opted new regulations requiring the public disclosure of the
individual audit partner responsible for each public company
audit (Reid & Youngman, 2017). In Spain, the first audit
law, enacted in 1988, required the signature of the lead audit
partner in the audit report. This requirement has been main-
tained in the subsequent reforms of the audit law. In the cur-
rent audit law endorsed in 2015, the obligation of signature
by the lead audit partner is explicitly recognized in Article 5.
Nevertheless, despite a significant increase in the number
of studies which examine the influence of individual audit-
ors on the quality of audit services, the specific issue of how
the audit experience of partners contribute to audit quality
has received very little attention. As the main exception,
Chi et al. (2017) investigate this issue in the context of the
Taiwanese audit market. The authors focus on the differences
between pre-client and client-specific experience, concluding
that both forms of audit experience improve audit quality,
and that pre-client experience is positively associated with
audit quality during the early years of the audit engagement,
but not in the later years.
We continue Chi et al. (2017) line of research and invest-
igate the relationship between partners audit experience and
audit quality in the Spanish audit market for the research
period between 2005 and 2013. Our study utilises discretion-
ary accruals and the opinion of the audit report as the proxies
for audit quality. However, whereas Chi et al. (2017) focus
the attention on the different impact of pre-client and client-
specific experience, our main interest is on the respective
contributions of the industry-specific and the generic audit
experience of audit partners on the quality of audit services.
Our approach is that when an auditor audits a client, let’s say,
in the construction sector, his/her audit experience is given
by the total number of clients the auditor has audited in the
past. However, part of this audit experience has been gained
with clients in the construction sector (industry-specific ex-
perience), and part of it with clients in other sectors (generic
audit experience). Following the conclusions of scholars in
the psychological learning field (e.g. Chi et al., 1982; Glaser
& Chi, 1988), we understand that for the auditing of a cli-
ent in the construction sector, the experience of the auditor
with other construction firms is more relevant that, for ex-
ample, the experience with financial institutions. We intend
to contribute to the literature on the role of the individual
auditor for the quality of audit services, in two main ways.
First, by extending the work of Chi et al. (2017). It should
be noted that, as Bedard (2012) points out, the importance of
the professional audit environment to understand how indi-
vidual auditors affect audit quality makes it difficult to gener-
alize results. In this regard, as Chi et al. (2017), we provide
evidence of the different contribution of pre-client and client-
specific audit experience to audit quality; yet, the most inter-
esting feature of our study is the investigation of the respect-
ive contribution of industry-specific and generic audit exper-
ience. Secondly, whereas the results of most previous stud-
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ies on partners’ industry specialisation indicate that industry-
specific experience is more important than generic experi-
ence to explain the quality of audit services (e.g. Chi & Chin,
2011; Zerni, 2012), these studies cannot explain whether
or not generic audit experience is still relevant. Moreover,
these papers justify the link between industry specialisation
and audit quality on the fact that more specialised partners
are expected to be more expert auditors. Nevertheless, in-
dustry specialisation might be only a poor proxy for expert-
ise, mainly because the industry-specialisation variables used
in these studies ignore the whole audit career and acquired
experience of the auditor (see for example, the recent study
of Garcia-Blandon & Argiles-Bosch, 2018, also in the context
of the Spanish audit market).1 Regarding prior studies on
partner’s industry specialization, our approach takes into ac-
count the whole audit career of audit partners (and not only
a single specific year), and allows to understand whether gen-
eric audit experience is important or not. Beyond the audit
field, this study intends to contribute to the existing literature
on expertise, as it provides evidence of how specialised and
generic knowledge impact the quality of complex services.
In anticipation of our results, we provide evidence that
partner’s industry-specific experience does enhance the qual-
ity of audit services. However, neither client-specific exper-
ience nor generic audit experience show any significant re-
lationship with audit quality. Therefore, similar to Chi et
al. (2017), we also find that pre-client audit experience con-
tributes to higher audit quality; yet when we differentiate
between industry-specific and generic audit experience, only
the former appears to be relevant. Additionally, unlike Chi
et al. (2017), our results do not indicate any significant rela-
tionship between client-specific experience and audit quality.
These differences highlight the importance of the current pro-
fessional audit environment to fully understand the impact
of individual auditors on audit quality (Bedard, 2012), and
stress the difficulties for generalizing results. The remaining
body of the paper is structured as follows. The next section
discusses previous literature, developing and formulating our
hypotheses. The third section shows the design of the empir-
ical research and the selection of the sample. Results are
presented and discussed in section four. Finally, in the last
section, conclusions are drawn, and the implications and lim-
itations of this research are discussed.
2. Background and Hypothesis Development
This section discusses the results of prior studies and devel-
ops the hypotheses, by distinguishing three levels of audit ex-
perience: client-specific, industry-specific and generic audit
experience.
2.1. Client-Specific Experience
According to the discussion in the introductory section, if
expertise is mainly achieved through highly specific know-
ledge (Patel & Groen, 1991), when auditing a client, the most
obvious source of specific knowledge is the experience with
this client in the past. However, according to the classical
definition of audit quality by DeAngelo (1981), as the joint
probability that an auditor will both detect and report mater-
ial misstatements, although client-specific knowledge should
1According to these papers, an auditor acting as a signing partner for the
very first year of his/her career and with only two clients, but both in the
same industry, might be seen as more of an expert than another partner with
more than 20 years of experience as a signing auditor and having audited
more than 50 clients in different industries.
enhance the auditor’s ability to detect misstatements, its in-
dependence might also be lower when the auditor has been
auditing the client for a long period (Mautz & Sharaf, 1961).
Therefore, the a priori impact of client-specific experience on
audit quality could be either positive or negative. In the US
case, Manry et al. (2008) observe that audit quality, proxied
by discretionary accruals, is positively and significantly asso-
ciated with the number of years the client has been audited
by the same partner. The available evidence for Taiwan is
mixed, as Chen et al. (2008) and Chi et al. (2017) find
higher audit quality in longer partner tenures, although Chi &
Huang (2005) observe that audit quality first increases with
partner tenure but later declines. Evidence for the Australian
audit market supports lower audit quality in longer tenures
with the client. Fargher et al. (2008) observe lower (higher)
manager’s accounting discretion (audit quality) in the initial
years of tenure of a new audit partner of the same firm, while
Carey & Simnett (2006) and Ye et al. (2011) report that long-
tenured partners are less likely to issue going-concern mod-
ified reports to financially distressed clients, thus showing
lower independence. For the Spanish audit market, Garcia-
Blandon & Argiles-Bosch (2017) do not support that longer
tenures with a client involve significantly different levels of
audit quality. As from a theoretical lens, client-specific know-
ledge could either enhance (through a “competence effect”)
or erode (through an “independence effect”) audit quality,
and given the inconclusive empirical evidence, we do not an-
ticipate the sign of the effect. Therefore, we pose the first
hypothesis of this study (H1) in the null form, as follows:
Hypothesis 1: The client-specific audit experience
of individual auditors will not have a significant im-
pact on audit quality.
2.2. Industry-Specific Experience
According to the learning-by-doing through experience
framework (e.g. Ackerman, 1987; Ericsson et al., 1993),
when auditing a client, the most valuable source of know-
ledge (apart from the very specific knowledge of this client)
should be the experience gained through the auditing of sim-
ilar clients. Following prior studies, we define client sim-
ilarity as clients who belong to or are within the same in-
dustry. While previous literature has not examined the rela-
tionship between partners’ industry-specific audit experience
and audit services quality, a few studies have addressed the
related issue of partners’ industry specialisation (Chi & Chin,
2011; Chin & Chi, 2009; Garcia-Blandon & Argiles-Bosch,
2018; Goodwin & Wu, 2014; Nagy, 2014; Zerni, 2012). The
main differences among these studies are the country-specific
focus and investigation (US: Nagy, 2014; Taiwan: Chi & Chin,
2011 and Chin & Chi, 2009; Sweden: Zerni, 2012; Australia:
Goodwin & Wu, 2014; and Spain: Garcia-Blandon & Argiles-
Bosch, 2018), and the proxy for the quality of audit services
(the restatement of financial statements: Chin & Chi, 2009;
discretionary accruals and the opinion of the audit report:
Chi & Chin, 2011 and Garcia-Blandon & Argiles-Bosch, 2018;
and fees for audit services: Goodwin & Wu, 2014; Nagy,
2014; Zerni, 2012). These articles tend to support that in-
dustry specialisation does enhance audit quality.
Chin & Chi (2009) find a negative relationship between in-
dustry specialisation and the likelihood of accounting restate-
ments in Taiwan, and thus, having a positive effect on audit
quality. Still for Taiwan, Chi & Chin (2011) observe that cli-
ents of industry specialists’ auditors are more likely to receive
a modified opinion (higher audit quality). For Sweden, Zerni
(2012) conclude that industry specialisation is regarded as
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a differentiation strategy in terms of audit quality as prox-
ied by audit services fees. In the same way, Goodwin & Wu
(2014) and Nagy (2014) find that the industry specialisation
of individual auditors demands a fee premium in the US and
Australian audit markets, respectively. Nevertheless, in some
cases, the support in favour of industry specialisation is less
clear. Hence, the negative association between partner in-
dustry specialisation and discretionary accruals reported in
Chi & Chin (2011) is significant only at marginal levels. Sim-
ilarly, Garcia-Blandon & Argiles-Bosch (2018) do not find
any significant relationship between industry specialisation
and audit quality in the Spanish audit market, as neither the
levels of discretionary accruals nor the opinion of the audit re-
port are significantly affected by the level of industry special-
isation of individual auditors. It should be noted that the lack
of significant results in Chi & Chin (2011) or Garcia-Blandon
& Argiles-Bosch (2018) does not necessarily indicate that in-
dustry experience is irrelevant in terms of audit quality, but
simply that it is not more relevant than generic audit experi-
ence.
Based on the psychological literature on expertise (e.g. Chi
et al., 1982; Glaser & Chi., 1988), we expect industry know-
ledge to have a positive impact on the quality of audit ser-
vices. Moreover, unlike client-specific experience, industry-
specific experience does not involve any potentially negat-
ive effects on the independence dimension of audit quality,
and most prior studies have shown a positive relationship
between industry specialisation and audit quality. Therefore,
we pose the second hypothesis (H2) of this study as follows:
Hypothesis 2: The industry-specific audit experi-
ence of individual auditors will have a positive and
significant impact on audit quality.
This study uses two labels (“subsector” and “sector”) to
account for industry-specific experience. Clients belonging
to the same subsector are expected to show stronger similar-
ities compared to those who belong to the same sector but
to different subsectors. This twofold definition of industry
should provide a detailed picture of the relative importance
of specialised and generic knowledge as drivers of the qual-
ity of audit services. According to the aforementioned discus-
sion, we expect stronger effects for industry-specific experi-
ence when industry is defined at the subsector level.
2.3. Generic Audit Experience
Patel & Groen’s (1991) study of expertise differentiates
between generic and highly specific knowledge. Although
specific knowledge is a necessary condition to achieve the
level of expert, for lower levels of expertise (i.e. sub-expert
level) generic knowledge is sufficient. Schilling et al. (2003)
point out that varied prior learning might also enhance, or
at least not negatively impact, the future learning rate. The
reason is that prior knowledge (not necessarily specific know-
ledge) confers an ability to recognize the value, assimila-
tion and application of new information (Cohen & Levinthal,
1990). As Schilling et al. (2003, p. 44) remark: “Psycho-
logy studies of individual learning have demonstrated that
related task variation (varying the content or context of the
task) may enhance the learning process through facilitating
the development of more abstract principles (or”schema“) re-
lated to a general class of tasks”. The auditing of clients from
different industries provides, in our view, a meaningful ex-
ample of related task variation.
We have not found any empirical studies on the import-
ance of generic audit experience for the quality of the audit
services provided by individual auditors. Besides, the few
papers that have concluded that specialised knowledge con-
tributes more to expertise than generic knowledge (Chi &
Chin, 2011; Chin & Chi, 2009; Goodwin & Wu, 2014; Nagy,
2014; Zerni, 2012) do not explain whether generic know-
ledge still contributes to expertise. Nevertheless, the results
of Wang et al. (2015) for Sonu et al. (2016) for Korea and
Chi et al. (2017) for Taiwan can shed some light on this issue.
While these articles report a positive and significant relation-
ship between the length of a partner’s audit experience and
audit quality,2 none of them differentiate between industry-
specific and generic audit experience. Although there is no
direct evidence of the impact of generic experience on expert-
ise, given that partners with longer audit careers are expec-
ted to show stronger generic audit experience, the evidence
reported by these articles suggests a positive and significant
relationship between generic audit experience and the qual-
ity of audit services. Accordingly, we pose the third and last
hypothesis of this study (H3) as follows:
Hypothesis 3: The generic audit experience of indi-
vidual auditors will have a positive and significant
impact on audit quality.
Following our previous discussion, we expect a weaker ef-
fect on audit quality for generic audit experience than for
industry-specific experience.
3. Research Design and Sample Selection
3.1. Research Design
In line with previous related studies, we utilise the client’s
level of discretionary accruals and the opinion of the audit re-
port as the proxies for the quality of audit services. In the first
case, we assume that clients of high-quality auditors will ma-
nipulate less financial statement, and thus will present lower
levels of discretionary accruals (Carey & Simnett, 2006; Chi
et al., 2017). As for the opinion of the audit report, similar to
prior studies (e.g. Carey & Simnett, 2006; Chi & Chin, 2011),
a lower propensity to issue a qualified report to a client who
deserves it is considered as an indicator of weak auditor in-
dependence and, therefore, of lower audit quality.
3.1.1. Analysis conducted with discretionary accruals
The first empirical analysis is conducted with discretionary
accruals computed as the residuals of Eq. (1) below, which
represents Dechow et al. (1995) version of Jones’ (1991)
model:
TAt/At−1 = α1(1/At−1) +α2((∆REVt −∆RECt)/At−1)) +
α3(PPEt/At−1) + ϵt (1)
where:
TAt is total accruals in year t;
∆REVt is revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1;
∆RECt is net receivables in year t less net receivables in
year t-1;
PPEt is gross property plant and equipment at the end of
year t;
At−1 is total assets at the end of year t-1;
2Wang et al. (2015) and Chi et al. (2017) define experience by the
cumulative number of years from the partner’s first year as signing partner
for any company and Sonu et al. (2016) by the length of an audit partner’s
experience as a certified public accountant.
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α1, α2 and α3 are the parameters to be estimated; and
ϵt is the error term.
Unlike most prior studies which conduct cross-sectional
estimations of Jones model by industry, we follow Mora &
Sabater’s (2008) approach of industry-panel estimations of
the model. Our decision is based on the relatively low num-
ber of firms per year and industry in our sample, a usual
situation in international settings (Francis & Wang, 2008).
Subsequently, we propose a model with the absolute value
of discretionary accruals as the dependent variable, and with
our variables of interest measuring audit experience and the
usual control variables in the literature (e.g. Carey & Simnett,
2006; Chi & Chin, 2011; Chi et al., 2017; Garcia-Blandon
& Argiles-Bosch, 2018) as the independent variables. The
model we propose is shown by Eq. (2) below.
DACCRABSi,t = β0 + β1EX PERIENCEi,t + β2ASSETSi,t+
β3AGEi,t + β4CASHF LOWi,t + β5LAGACCRi,t+
β6DEBTi,t + β7GROWTHi,t + β8T ENUREi,t+
β9C IMPRTi,t + β10EX PERT Fi,t + β11EX PERT Pi,t+
β12BIG4i,t + f i xed e f f ec tsi,t +µi,t (2)
where,
Dependent variable:
DACCRABS: discretionary accruals obtained as the
residuals of the estimation of Eq. (1), in absolute
values.
Variable of interest (EXPERIENCE):
We conduct four sequential estimations of Eq. (2),
one with each definition of EXPERIENCE:
CLIENTEXP: number of consecutive audit reports of
the same client signed by the partner until the cur-
rent year;
SUBSECTOREXP: number of audit reports of com-
panies belonging to the client’s subsector (exclud-
ing the client) signed by the partner during his/her
audit career until the current year;
SECTOREXP: number of audit reports of compan-
ies in the client’s sector (excluding the client and
the client’s subsector) signed by the partner during
his/her audit career until the current year; and
GENERICEXP: number of audit reports of compan-
ies not belonging to the client’s sector signed by the
partner during his/her audit career until the cur-
rent year.
For the purposes of this research, we follow the industry
classification scheme provided by the Madrid Stock Ex-
change, which includes six main sectors and 28 subsectors.
The definition of industry in prior research on partners’ in-
dustry specialisation corresponds to the definition of sub-
sector used in this paper (i.e. Chi & Chin, 2011 consider 27
industries). As discussed in the former section, we include
two variables for measuring the impact of industry-specific
experience (SUBSECTOREXP and SECTOREXP), and an addi-
tional variable for generic audit experience (GENERICEXP).
Control variables:
ASSETS: logarithm of firm’s total assets;
AGE: logarithm of the number of years the client
has been listed by the supervisor of the Spanish
stock market;
CASHFLOW: cash flow from operations on total as-
sets;
LAGACCR: total accruals of the prior year on total
assets;
DEBT: firm’s liabilities on total assets;
GROWTH: change in total assets regarding the pre-
vious year;
TENURE: logarithm of the number of years of ten-
ure with the audit firm;
CIMPRT: total assets of the client divided by the
sum of total assets of all clients audited by the audit
partner in year t;
EXPERTF:1 if the company is audited by the lead
audit firm in its industry (defined at the subsector
level) in a year, and 0 otherwise;
EXPERTP:1 if the company is audited by the lead
audit partner in its industry (defined at the sub-
sector level) in a year, and 0 otherwise; and
BIG4: 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor and
0 otherwise.
The model also includes industry and year fixed effects.
The form of measuring the experience of the auditor con-
stitutes a main difference between this study and previous
works (Chi et al., 2017; Sonu et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2015).
Wang et al. (2015) and Chi et al. (2017) define the audit
experience by the number of years between the first audit re-
port signed by the partner and the current year, and Sonu et
al. (2016) by the number of years between the first year of
the auditor registered as a certified public accountant (CPA)
and the current year. In our view, both definitions are poten-
tially problematic. On the one hand, because, as Sonu et al.
(2016, p. 15) explicitly acknowledge: “our audit experience
variable is prone to a measurement error, as it is possible that
a CPA works for several years in auditing industry, moves to
an investment bank, comes back to auditing industry, and fi-
nally becomes an audit partner”. According to Sonu et al.
(2016) definition of experience, a partner with minimal or
even no real experience as a signing auditor may be labelled
as a highly experienced auditor. Moreover, for all audit part-
ners, every year registered as a CPA counts the same, no mat-
ter if he/she has audited one or ten clients. These problems
also affect, for the most part, the definition of experience
used by Chi et al. (2017) and Wang et al. (2015). Con-
versely, our measurement of experience allows to overcome
these shortcomings as it is based on the number of clients
that each audit partner has audited.
Next, we discuss the expected effects of the control vari-
ables in Eq. (2). We include ASSETS because larger firms
are expected to present higher levels of audit quality and
thus, less discretionary accruals (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986).
With AGE, we intend to capture the relationship between ac-
cruals and the firm’s life cycle (Anthony & Ramesh, 1992;
Healy, 1996). Following Myers, Myers & Omer (2003) and
Carey & Simnett (2006), among others, CASHFLOWS aims to
capture a positive relationship between operating cash flows
and firm performance (Frankel et al., 2002). Similar to Chi &
Chin (2011), we also control for LAGACCR due to the negat-
ive association of current accruals with previous-year accru-
als (Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Sloan, 1996). Following Becker,
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DeFond et al. (1998), among others, DEBT is in de model
because the stronger incentives to manipulate earnings for
firms with higher levels of debt. GROWTH intends to capture
the relationship between accruals and firms’ growth (John-
son et al., 2002). We do not anticipate the sign of the coeffi-
cient of TENURE as it might have opposite effects on each of
the competence and independence dimensions of audit qual-
ity. Similar to Chi et al. (2017), we also include CIMPRT,
EXPERTF and EXPERTP. Whereas CIMPRT aims to control for
the importance of the client for the audit partner; EXPERTF
and EXPERTP intend to capture the level of industry special-
ization of the audit firm and the audit partner, respectivelly.
Finally, BIG4 is included to capture the positive higher-quality
effect associated with Big 4 audit firms (Francis et al., 1999).
3.1.2. Analysis conducted with the opinion of the audit report
Together with discretionary accruals, the issuance of a
qualified report to a client who deserves it constitutes another
usual proxy for audit quality, as it is generally considered as
an indicator of auditor independence. The Spanish regula-
tion requires that the auditor express an opinion about the
clients’ financial statements, which can be: unqualified, qual-
ified, unfavourable or disclaimer of opinion. For the purpose
of this study, audit reports with qualified opinion, unfavour-
able opinion, disclaimer of opinion or with unqualified opin-
ion but including paragraphs of emphasis expressing uncer-
tainties, are jointly considered as audit reports with modified
audit opinion (MAO). To examine the impact of the experi-
ence of the auditor on the quality of audit services as meas-
ured by the likelihood of issuing a qualified report, we util-
ise the logistic model given by Eq. (3), below. The model
includes the opinion of the audit report (OPINION) as the de-
pendent variable, and our variable of interest (EXPERIENCE)
as well as the usual control variables used in the related liter-
ature (e.g. Carey & Simnett, 2006; Chi & Chin, 2011; Garcia-
Blandon & Argiles-Bosch, 2018).
OPIN IONi,t = λ0 +λ1EX PERIENCEi,t +λ2ASSETSi,t
+λ3AGEi,t +λ4DEBTi,t +λ5T ENUREi,t
+λ6C IMPRTi,t +λ7EX PERT Fi,t +λ8EX PERT Pi,t
+λ9BIG4i,t +λ10PBANKi,t +λ11LAGLOSSi,t
+λ12LIQU IDITYi,t + f i xed e f f ec tsi,t + θi,t (3)
where,
Dependent variable:
OPINION: a dichotomous variable, which takes the
value of 1 if the audit report has a MAO and 0 oth-
erwise.
We utilise the same four specific variables for EXPERIENCE
as in the former analysis with discretionary accruals (CLIEN-
TEXP, SUBSECTOREXP, SECTOREXP and GENERICEXP). These
variables have been already defined in Eq. (2). Moreover, as
with Eq. (2), we perform four sequential estimations of Eq.
(3), one for each definition of EXPERIENCE.
Control variables in Eq. (3) attempt to capture the incent-
ives of the auditor to issue a qualified audit report. Most
of them were also included in Eq. (2) (ASSETS, AGE, DEBT,
TENURE, CIMPRT, EXPERTF, EXPERTP and BIG4). However,
in this analysis, we also include:
PBANK: the probability of bankruptcy as captured
by adjusted Zmijewski scores provided by Zmijew-
ski (1984) with the weights proposed by Carcello
et al. (1995);
LAGLOSS: 1 if the company has negative net in-
come in the last two years and 0 otherwise; and
LIQUIDITY: current assets divided by current liabil-
ities.
We include ASSETS (no sign prediction) as client’s size
could influence the willingness of the auditor to issue a quali-
fied report. First, auditors may be more willing to issue qual-
ified reports to large clients as these clients involve higher
litigation costs (Lys & Watts, 1994; Shu, 2000). However,
higher accounting quality and more negotiation power might
make modified opinions less likely for large clients (Myers et
al., 2003). AGE (negative expected coefficient) is included
because young firms face higher bankruptcy risk. Following
the discussion of TENURE in Eq. (2), the effects of TENURE
on the likelihood of a MAO in the audit report could be either
positive or negative. We predict a negative coefficient for
CIMPRT, as the audit partner may be more reluctant to is-
sue a qualified report to a client when this client represents
a larger share of the partner’s portfolio of clients, and pos-
itive coefficient for EXPERTF and EXPERTP. As Carey & Sim-
nett (2006), among others, we include BIG4 (positive expec-
ted coefficient) to capture that Big 4 auditors may be more
willing to issue qualified reports. Finally, DEBT, PBANK, LA-
GLOSS, and LIQUIDITY intend to capture the financial situ-
ation of the auditor client. Accordingly, we predict positive
coefficients for DEBT, PBANK and LAGLOSS, as these vari-
ables are positively associated with financial distress (higher
litigation risk for the auditor) and a negative coefficient for
LIQUIDITY.
3.2. Sample
The sample for the empirical analysis comprises firms
quoted in the Spanish stock market (continuous market)
between 2005 and 2013. As it is usual in the related literat-
ure financial companies have been excluded from the sample.
The information about individual auditors and audit firms
is taken from the financial statements, made publicly avail-
able via the Spanish regulatory agency’s website, Comisión
Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV). Capital IQ database
is used for obtaining financial variables. Our variables ac-
counting for auditor experience (CLIENTEXP, SUBSECTOREXP,
SECTOREXP and GENERICEXP) were constructed with the in-
formation at the partner level available at CNMV registers. A
limitation of CNMV registers is that the first year of available
information is 1995. Thus, we are able to collect information
about the audit experience of individual auditors only from
1995 onwards. The initial sample consists of 101 firms and,
given the nine-year research period, by a maximum of 909
firm-year observations. However, we lost 62 firm-year obser-
vations because lack of data, and 49 because we removed
from the sample those firm-year observations associated to
audit firm changes. Hence, in the study conducted with dis-
cretionary accruals (model given by Eq. (2)), the final sample
consists of 798 firm-year observations. In the model given by
Eq. (3), the sample is further reduced by 36 observations due
to lack of data, leading to a final sample of 762 observations.
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for the sample.
Focusing on the variables of interest, we do not observe
strong industry specialisation of individual auditors, as GEN-
ERICEXP shows a larger mean than both variables account-
ing for industry-specific experience (SUBSECTOREXP and
SECTOREXP). Moreover, results for CLIENTEXP indicate that
auditor-client relationships last three years on average. On
the other hand, figures for SUBSECTOREXP and SECTOREXP
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics for our dataset
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for our dataset 
Panel A (variables of interest) 
VARIABLE MEAN ST. DEV. Q1 Q2 Q3 
CLIENTEXP  3.43 2.01 2.00 3.00 5.00 
SUBSECTOREXP 1.15 2.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SECTOREXP 1.15 2.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 
GENERICEXP 3.75 5.17 0.00 1.00 6.00 
Panel B (control variables) 
VARIABLE MEAN ST. DEV. Q1 Q2 Q3 
ASSETS 6.85 1.79 5.53 6.67 8.08 
AGE  2.65 0.64 2.30 2.94 3.09 
CASHFLOW 0.06 0.14 0.02 0.06 0.11 
LAGACCR -0.04 0.18 -0.08 -0.04 0.00 
DEBT 0.67 0.29 0.52 0.67 0.79 
GROWTH 1.49 6.15 0.93 1.05 1.17 
TENURE 2.11 0.77 1.60 2.20 2.77 
CIMPRT 0.74 0.36 0.45 1.00 1.00 
EXPERTF 0.14 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EXPERTP 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
BIG4  0.91 0.28 1.00 1.00 1.00 
PBANK -2.10 1.66 -3.29 -1.99 -0.87
LAGLOSS 0.21 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LIQUIDITY 1.44 1.31 0.91 1.18 1.59 
Variables of interest: 
CLIENTEXP (experience of the auditor with the client): number of consecutive audit reports of the same client signed 
by the partner until the current year; SUBSECTOREXP (experience of the auditor in the client’s subsector): number of 
audit reports of companies belonging to the client’s subsector (excluding the client) signed by the partner during his/her 
audit career until the current year; SECTOREXP (experience of the auditor in the client’s sector): number of audit 
reports of companies in the client’s sector (excluding the client and the client’s subsector) signed by the partner during 
his/her audit career until the current year; and GENERICEXP (generic audit experience of the auditor): number of audit 
reports of companies not belonging to the client’s sector signed by the partner during his/her audit career until the 
current year. 
Control variables: 
ASSETS (client’s size): logarithm of firm’s total assets; AGE (client’s age): logarithm of number of years the client has 
been listed by the supervisor of the Spanish stock market; CASHFLOW (client’s cash-flows from operations); cash 
flow from operations on total assets; LAGACCR (client’s lagged accruals): total accruals of the prior year on total 
assets; DEBT (client’s debt ratio): firm’s liabilities on total assets; GROWTH (client’s growth): change in total assets 
regarding the previous year; TENURE (audit firm tenure): logarithm of the number of years of tenure with the audit 
firm; CIMPRT (client’s importance): total assets of the client divided by the sum of total assets of all clients audited by 
the auditor partner in the same year; EXPERTF (expert audit firm): 1 if the company is audited by the lead audit firm 
in its industry (defined at subsector level) in a year, and 0 otherwise; EXPERTP (expert audit partner): 1 if the company 
is audited by the lead audit partner in its industry (defined at subsector level) in a year, and 0 otherwise; BIG4 (audit 
firm type): 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor and 0 otherwise; PBANK (client’s probability of bankruptcy): 
Zmijewski scores; LAGLOSS (client’s lagged loss): 1 if the company has negative net income in the last two years and 
0 otherwise; and LIQUIDITY (client’s liquidity): current assets divided by current liabilities. 
Variables of interest:
CLIENTEXP (experience of the auditor with the client): number of consecutive audit
reports of the same client signed by the partner until the current year; SUBSECTOREXP
(experience of the auditor in the client’s subsector): number of audit reports of
companies belonging to the client’s subsector (excluding the client) signed by the
partner during his/her audit career until the current year; SECTOREXP (experience of
the auditor in the client’s sector): number of audit reports of companies in the client’s
sector (excluding the client and the client’s subsector) signed by the partner during
his/her audit career until the current y ar; and GENERICEXP (generic audit experience
of the auditor): number of audit reports of companies not belonging to the client’s
sector signed by the partner during his/her audit career until the current year.
Control variables:
ASSETS (client’s size): logarithm of firm’s total assets; AGE (client’s age): logarit m
of number of years the client has been listed by the supervisor of the Spanish stock
market; CASHFLOW (client’s cash-flows from operations); cash flow from operations
on total assets; LAGACCR (client’s lagged accruals): total accruals of the prior year
on total assets; DEBT (client’s debt ratio): firm’s liabilities on total assets; GROWTH
(client’s growth): change in total assets regarding the previous year; TENURE (audit
firm tenure): logarithm of the number of years of tenure with the audit firm; CIMPRT
(client’s importance): to al ssets of the client divided by the sum of total assets of all
clients audited by the auditor partner in the same year; EXPERTF (expert audit firm):
1 if the company is audited by the lead audit firm in its industry (defined at subsector
level) in a year, and 0 otherwise; EXPERTP (expert audit partner): 1 if the company is
audited by the lead audit partn r in its industry (defined at subsector level) in a year,
and 0 otherwise; BIG4 (audit firm type): 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor and
0 otherwise; PBANK (client’s probability of bankruptcy): Zmijewski scores; LAGLOSS
(client’s lagged loss): 1 if the company has negative net income in the last two years
and 0 otherwise; and LIQUIDITY (client’s liquidity): current assets divided by current
liabilities.
are rather similar. As for the control variables in Eq. (2), the
most interesting results is extremely high level of concentra-
tion of the Spanish audit market for quoted companies by Big
4 audit firms. The correlation matrix (untabulated) shows
the predicted significant relationships of discretionary accru-
als (DACCRABS) with ASSETS, AGE, CASHFLOW, LAGACCR,
DEBT, GROWTH, TENURE and BIG4. However, the correl-
ation with CIMPRT and EXPERTF is insignificant, and with
EXPERTP is significant but with an unexpected positive sign.
We also observe negative and significant correlations of dis-
cretionary accruals with all the variables measuring partner’s
experience, thus suggesting a positive impact of the audit ex-
perience on the quality of audit services. It also shows the
expected high positive correlations among variables measur-
ing experience, as partners with longer (shorter) audit ca-
reers tend to show higher (lower) levels of audit experience
with the client, in the client’s industry as well as generic audit
experience. This fact supports our decision to perform se-
quential estimations of Eq. (2) and (3) with one measure of
experience at a time. Finally, the correlation pattern of inde-
pendent variables does not suggest serious multicollinearity
in our dataset.
4. Results of the Study
4.1. Analysis Conducted with Discretionary Accruals
Table 2 shows the results of the sequential estimations of
Eq. (2)with each measure of experience: CLIENTEXP (Model
1), SUBSECTOREXP (Model 2), SECTOREXP (Model 3) and
GENERICEXP (Model 4). To minimize the incidence of out-
liers in our estimations, variables are winsorized at the top
and bottom 1 percent of their respective distributions. In
keeping with the panel structure of the dataset, panel data
estimations are conducted. The Hausman test suggests the
use of random effects models and, subsequently, the Breusch-
Pagan Lagrange multiplier test supports the panel data ap-
proach over ordinary least squares regressions. As we detect
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the dataset, we es-
timate Eq. (2) with Prais-Wistein regression with heterosce-
dastic panels corrected errors. Even though the analysis of
the covariance matrix does not suggest serious multicollin-
earity problems, we compute variance inflation factors (un-
tabulated) to further discard the negative effects of multicol-
linearity on the estimates. As expected, the values of variance
inflation factors do not indicate multicollinearity problems in
the dataset (mean of 2.23 with a maximum value of 3.15 for
LAGACCR).
Table 2 shows that all four estimations are significant at
s andard statistically levels. Focusing on the variables of in-
terest measu ing auditor experience, we report significant
results nly for SUBSECTOREXP (p-value < 0.05) in Model
2, with the predicted negative sign. Hence, partners with
stronger audit experience in the client’s subsector present
higher levels of audit quality. Conversely, client-specific ex-
perience, experience in the client’s sector (excluding the sub-
sector), as well as generic audit experience do not seem to in-
volve any significantly different levels of audit quality. These
results support Hypothesis 1 (as it was posed in the null form)
and Hypothesis 2 (though only when industry is defined at
the subsector level). Conversely, Hypothesis 3 is rejected, as
neric audi experience does not seem to have any signific-
ant impact on the quality of audit services.
As we discussed in the review of the literature section of
the study, prior research on the impact of client-specific ex-
perience on audit quality has reported inconclusive results.
However, the lack of significant effects of this type of audit ex-
perience observed here supports prior evidence for the Span-
ish audit market (Garcia-Blandon & Argiles-Bosch, 2017). It
should be noted, however, that Chi et al. (2017) find, not
only that client-specific experience is an important driver of
audit quality, but also that it dominates over pre-client audit
experience. The differences between our results and Chi et al.
(2017) highlight the importance of the current professional
audit environment to understand the impact of individual
auditors on audit quality (Bedard, 2012), and consequently,
the difficulties of generalizing results. Regarding pre-client
experience, Chi et al. (2017) conclude that it is positively
associated with audit quality. However, they do not differen-
tiate between industry-specific experience and generic audit
experience. Therefore, our findings complement the results
of Chi et al. (2017), as we observe that when auditing a
client, the only relevant pre-client audit experience is the ex-
perience of the auditor in the client’s industry.
Our findings can be also interpreted in the light of the lit-
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Table 2
The relationship between auditor experience and the quality of audit
services as measured by discretionary accruals. Dependent variable:
absolute discretionary accruals
-0.000 
(-0.31)
 
* , ** , *** Statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
CLIENTEXP (experience of the auditor with the client); SUBSECTOREXP (exper-
ience of the auditor in the client’s subsector); SECTOREXP (experience of the auditor
in the client’s sector); GENERICEXP (generic audit experience of the auditor); ASSETS
(client’s size); AGE (client’s age); CASHFLOW (client’s cash-flows from operations);
LAGACCR (client’s lagged accruals) DEBT (client’s debt ratio); GROWTH (client’s
growth); TENURE (audit firm tenure); CIMPRT (client’s importance); EXPERTF (expert
audit firm); EXPERTP (expert audit partner); and BIG4 (audit firm type).
erature on the importance auditor industry specialisation for
the quality of audit services. Prior studies on this field gen-
erally conclude that industry specialisation has a positive im-
pact on audit quality (Chi & Chin, 2011; Chin & Chi, 2009;
Zerni, 2012). Therefore, the negative and significant coef-
ficient on SUBSECTEXP in Model 2 is consistent with most
prior studies on industry specialisation supporting that spe-
cialised knowledge is a driver of expertise in the audit sec-
tor. However, our approach based on the examination of
the audit career of individual auditors presents important
advantages compared to prior studies on industry special-
isation. First, as these studies define industry specialisation
based only on the current portfolio of clients of the partner,
they ignore any audit experience gained by the auditor in
the previous years. As Ittonen et al. (2015) point out, fo-
cusing only on the current year, thus ignoring all the previ-
ous audit experience of individual auditors makes it difficult
to adequately capture audit partner’s expertise. The results
for SUBSECTOR combined with the lack of significance of EX-
PERTP in all the estimations and with the findings of Garcia-
Blandon & Argiles-Bosch (2018) study on partner’s industry
specialisation, also in the context of the Spanish audit mar-
ket, showing no significant effects of industry specialization
on audit quality, provides support for this view. These dif-
ferences indicate that considering the whole audit career of
the auditor provides a better proxy for expertise than focus-
ing only on the current year. Secondly, the industry special-
isation approach does not allow a proper assessment of the
importance of generic audit experience as a determinant of
audit quality. The reporting of a positive impact of industry
specialisation on audit quality merely indicates that industry-
specific experience is more relevant than generic audit experi-
ence. However, we do not know whether or not generic audit
experience is still relevant. In this regard, our results do not
only indicate that industry-specific experience is relevant for
audit quality, but more interestingly in terms of the contribu-
tion to the audit literature, that it is the only type of audit
experience that seems to matter.
Results for control variables are very much in line with our
expectations. Hence, we report significant effects for ASSETS,
AGE, CASHFLOW, DEBT, GROWTH and BIG4, in all cases in
the predicted direction.
Table 3
The relationship between auditor experience and the quality of audit
services as measured by discretionary accruals. Dependent variable: signed
discretionary accruals
 
* , ** , *** Statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
CLIENTEXP (experience of the auditor with the client); SUBSECTOREXP (exper-
ience of the auditor in the client’s subsector); SECTOREXP (experience of the auditor
in the client’s sector); GENERICEXP (generic audit experience of the auditor); ASSETS
(client’s size); AGE (client’s age); CASHFLOW (client’s cash-flows from operations);
LAGACCR (client’s lagged accruals) DEBT (client’s debt ratio); GROWTH (client’s
growth); TENURE (audit firm tenure); CIMPRT (client’s importance); EXPERTF (expert
audit firm); EXPERTP (expert audit partner); and BIG4 (audit firm type).
As usual in the literature, we complement the analysis us-
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ing discretionary accruals in absolute values with a similar
analysis with signed discretionary accruals (e.g. Carey & Sim-
nett, 2006; Myers et al., 2003). According to Ashbaugh et al.
(2003) and Gul et al. (2009) among others, negative discre-
tionary accruals could, in fact, be regarded as a form of con-
servative accounting. Hence, earnings management through
income-decreasing accruals may indicate higher audit quality
as it involves stronger accounting conservatism of the auditor.
Results of the new estimations, displayed in Table 3, show
a negative and significant coefficient of SUBSECTOREXP (p-
value < 0.10), and therefore a positive effect of industry-
specific experience on audit quality. Besides, as the results
of the analysis with accruals in absolute values displayed in
Table 2, the remaining variable of interest (CLIENTEXP, SEC-
TOREXP and GENERICEXP) show insignificant results in all
cases.
After the estimations we assess whether our results may
be affected by potential endogeneity in the model. Chi et al.
(2017, p. 383) argue that the negative relationship they re-
port between auditor’s experience and discretionary accruals
could merely indicate that “partners with longer pre-client
experience (more senior partners) audit”better clients" than
partners with shorter pre-client experience (younger part-
ners)". The authors finally discard that their results were
affected by endogeneity. Similarly, we may also expect en-
dogeneity problems with regard SECTOREXP and above all
for GENERICEXP, but not for SUBSECTOREXP. The reason is
that, given the generally low number of firms per subsector
in the Spanish stock market, each audit firm has just a few
clients in each subsector. Moreover, the mandatory rotation
of partners after the seventh consecutive year auditing the
same client and the fact that audit firms tend to exhaust this
seven-year period, minimize the flexibility of the audit firm
for assigning the best clients in each subsector to more senior
partners. Conversely, when we consider SECTOREXP, and par-
ticularly, GENERICEXP, because of the larger number of cli-
ents for each audit firm, there are more possibilities that cli-
ents are assigned according to the seniority of audit partners.
The fact that in the cases when more serious endogeneity
problems can be expected, we report insignificant results for
both variables suggests that the results for SUBSECTOREXP
are not affected by endogeneity.
4.2. Analysis Conducted with the Auditor’s Opinion
Before the estimations of the logistic model given by Eq.
(3), we perform a preliminary univariate analysis of mean
and median differences for our variables of interest (CLIENT-
EXP, SUBSECTOREXP, SECTOREXP andGENERICEXP) by type
of opinion in the audit report. Audit reports with MAOs rep-
resent, on average, 20 percent of the total reports.3 Results
of this analysis are shown in Table 4. The t-test and theMann-
Whitney test are used to account for the assessment of signi-
ficant differences in mean and median values, respectively.
Mean and median values do not show large differences de-
pending on the opinion of the audit report. Specifically, we
only observe significant differences for GENERICEXP (p-value
< 0.05 with the t-test). This result suggests that partners with
stronger generic audit experience seem more willing to issue
MAOs. Overall, results from this univariate analysis do not
suggest a strong impact of partner’s audit experience on audit
quality as measured by the opinion of the audit report.
Next, we perform the multivariate analysis conducted
through logistic estimations of Eq. (3). Results of the es-
3This percentage is 7%, 8%, 10%, 20%, 19%, 22%, 30%, 35% and 34%
in the years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013
respectively.
Table 4
Mean (median) values of the variables measuring experience by type of
opinion in the audit report
Table 4. Mean (median) values of the variables measuring experience by type of opinion in 
the audit report 
 
 
 
** Statistical significance at 5%. The t-test (Mann-Whitney test) is used for the signi-
ficance analysis of means (medians).
CLIENTEXP (experience of the auditor with the client); SUBSECTOREXP (exper-
ience of the auditor in the client’s subsector); SECTOREXP (experience of the auditor
in the client’s sector); GENERICEXP (generic audit experience of the auditor)
timations are shown in Table 5. The log-likelihood ratio test
(untabulated) suggest the use of pooled logistic regression
over panel data estimations. Therefore, we estimate Eq. (3)
with pooled logistic regression and errors clustered at the
firm level. All four estimations are globally significant with
39% pseudo R-squared. The main result in Table 5 is the
lack of significant effects for any of the variables measuring
auditor experience. Nevertheless, we should note that in all
cases the coefficients of our variables of interest present the
predicted sign and, in the specific cases of SUBSECTOREXP,
the coefficient is not far from being marginally significant (p-
value = 0.152). Thus, partner’s audit experience does not
seem to affect audit quality as measured by the likelihood of
a MAO in the audit report. This main result does not provide
support for Hypotheses 2 or 3, where both cases advocate a
positive effect of experience on audit quality. The only ex-
ception occurs for client-specific experience (Hypothesis 1),
formulated in the null form. Following the analysis conduc-
ted with discretionary accruals in the previous subsection, we
expected a positive and significant effect, at least for SUB-
SECTOREXP. This expectation was also based on the results of
Chi & Chin (2011) showing that clients of industry-specialist
auditors are more likely to receive MAOs from their aud-
itors, although Garcia-Blandon & Argiles-Bosch (2018) do
not observe significant differences in the likelihood of audit
qualifications between industry-specialist auditors and non-
specialist auditors. Nevertheless, results of the univariate
analysis in Table 4 already anticipated the lack of signific-
ant effects of industry-specific experience on the opinion of
the audit report. Similar to the study conducted with discre-
tionary accruals, results for control variables strongly meet
our expectations, as whenever a significant effect is reported
(ASSETS, DEBT, PBANK and LAGLOSS), it is always in the pre-
dicted direction.
We check the sensitivity of our results to the type of audit
qualification. MAOs can be broadly classified into audit qual-
ifications for reasons of going-concern and for other reasons.
The different nature of both types of qualifications as well as
the different implications for the client (and consequently, for
the auditor-client relationship) might justify conducting sep-
arate analyses for both types of MAOs. Similar to Chi & Chin
(2011), we perform segmented analyses by type of MAO, dif-
ferentiating between going-concern MAOs and other types
of MAOs. First, for the analysis restricted to going-concern
MAOs, Table 6 displays the results of the re-estimations of
Eq. (3), after removing from the sample those observations
with MAOs for other reasons. The most interesting result
is the significant coefficient of SUBSECTOREXP (p-value <
0.01) with the predicted positive sign. It indicates that audit
partners with stronger industry experience (at the subsector
level) are more willing to issue a going-concern MAO to a
client which deserves it, thus suggesting stronger independ-
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Table 5
The relationship between auditor experience and the quality of audit
services as measured by the likelihood of MAOs. All types of audit
qualifications are collectively considered as MAOs
Table 5. The relationship between auditor experience and the quality of audit services as 
measured by th  likelihood of MAOs. All types of it qualifications are collectively 
considered as MAOs 
 
 
* , ** , *** Statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
CLIENTEXP (experience of the auditor with the client); SUBSECTOREXP (exper-
ience of the auditor in the client’s subsector); SECTOREXP (experience of the auditor
in the client’s sector); GENERICEXP (generic audit experience of the auditor);
LAGOPINION (lagged opinion); ASSETS (client’s size); AGE (client’s age); DEBT
(client’s debt ratio); TENURE (audit firm tenure); CIMPRT (client’s importance);
EXPERTF (expert audit firm); EXPERTP (expert audit partner); BIG4 (audit firm type);
PBANK (client’s probability of bankruptcy); LAGLOSS (client’s lagged loss); and
LIQUIDITY (client’s liquidity).
ence and higher audit quality. Conversely, for all the remain-
ing definitions of experience, and in particular, for generic
audit experience, results are insignificant. It should also be
noted the strong explanatory power of the model as shown
by Pseudo R-squared values, and the fact that most control
variables present significant coefficients.
Subsequently, we perform a similar analysis though restric-
ted to non-going-concern MAOs. Table 7 displays the res-
ults of the re-estimations of Eq. (3) after removing from the
sample those observations with going-concern MAOs. The
most interesting result is the significant effects observed for
SUBSECTOREXP and SECTOREXP (p-value < 0.10), in both
cases with the predicted positive sign. This indicates a higher
propensity to issue non-going-concern MAOs (higher-quality
audit services) by those auditors with stronger industry-
specific experience, no matter whether industries are defined
at the sector of subsector levels. It should be noted, that com-
pared to the former analysis conducted with going-concern
MAOs, both the explanatory power of the proposed model
and the number of control variables with statistically signific-
ant coefficients are considerably lower.
Consistent with the results of the analysis conducted with
Table 6
The rel tionship be ween auditor experience and the quality of audit
services as measured by the likelihood of going-concern MAOs
T le 6. The relationship between auditor experience and the quality of audit services as 
measured by the likelihood of going-concern MAOs  
 
 
* , ** , *** Statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
CLIENTEXP (experience of the auditor with the client); SUBSECTOREXP (exper-
ience of the auditor in the client’s subsector); SECTOREXP (experience of the auditor
in the client’s sector); GENERICEXP (generic audit experience of the auditor);
LAGOPINION (lagged opinion); ASSETS (client’s size); AGE (client’s age); DEBT
(client’s debt ratio); TENURE (audit firm tenure); CIMPRT (client’s importance);
EXPERTF (expert audit firm); EXPERTP (expert audit partner); BIG4 (audit firm type);
PBANK (client’s probability of bankruptcy); LAGLOSS (client’s lagged loss); and
LIQUIDITY (client’s liquidity).
discretionary accruals as the measure of audit quality depic-
ted in Tables 2 and 3, the figures displayed in Tables 6 and
7 also indicate that industry-specific audit experience is the
only type of audit experience that seems to matter in terms
of audit quality. It may seem surprising that when all types
of MAOs are jointly considered, the coefficient of SUBSECT-
OREXP is insignificant, whereas in both segmented analyses
by type of MAO, SUBSECTOREXP present significant coeffi-
cients in all cases. We understand that these differences are
explained by the different drivers of going-concern and non-
going-concern MAOs. We base this view on the differences
in both the explanatory power of the estimations (Pseudo
R-squared is 75 percent in the model restricted to going-
concern MAO and only 28 percent in the model with non-
going-concern MAO), and in the number of control variables
with significant coefficients (up to nine in the model with
going-concern MAO versus only three in the model with non-
going-concern MAO). This indicates that model displayed by
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Eq. (3) is more suitable to explain the auditor’s decision to
issue a going-concern MAO than other types of MAOs.
Table 7
The relationship between auditor experience and the quality of audit
services as measured by the likelihood of non-going-concern MAOs
Table 7. The relationship between auditor experience and the quality of audit services as 
measured by the likelihood of non-going-concern MAOs  
 
 
* , ** , *** Statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
CLIENTEXP (experience of the auditor with the client); SUBSECTOREXP (exper-
ience of the auditor in the client’s subsector); SECTOREXP (experience of the auditor
in the client’s sector); GENERICEXP (generic audit experience of the auditor);
LAGOPINION (lagged opinion); ASSETS (client’s size); AGE (client’s age); DEBT
(client’s debt ratio); TENURE (audit firm tenure); CIMPRT (client’s importance);
EXPERTF (expert audit firm); EXPERTP (expert audit partner); BIG4 (audit firm type);
PBANK (client’s probability of bankruptcy); LAGLOSS (client’s lagged loss); and
LIQUIDITY (client’s liquidity).
5. Conclusions, implications and limitations
Through this study, we have investigated how the audit
experience of individual auditors contributes to the quality
of the audit services. Since experience constitutes a main
driver of expertise, highly-experienced auditors are expec-
ted to provide higher-quality audit services. The results of
the study indicate that there exists a positive and significant
relationship between the industry-specific experience of in-
dividual auditors and the quality of audit services. Further-
more, the results show that neither the client-specific exper-
ience nor the generic audit experience of audit partners sig-
nificantly contribute to audit quality. Both results can be re-
garded as considerable robust. The first one holds in the two
analyses conducted with discretionary accruals as the meas-
ure of audit quality, no matter if accruals are computed in
absolute or signed values, as well as in both segmented ana-
lyses using the opinion of the audit report as the indicator
of audit quality. With regard the lack of a significant rela-
tionship between either client-specific experience or generic
audit experience and audit quality, this result holds, with no
exception, in all the analyses conducted through this study.
A straightforward practical implication of these two find-
ings is that, in order to provide higher-quality audit services,
audit firms should encourage the industry specialisation of
individual auditors. It should be noted that, according to the
results of this study, the generic audit experience of the audit
partner is irrelevant in terms of its potential contribution to
audit quality. Therefore, an eventual reinforcement of the in-
dustry specialization of individual auditors within the audit
firm would likely result, not only in lower audit costs for the
audit firm, but also in higher levels of audit quality. Due to
the fact that small audit firms have less possibilities for imple-
menting industry specialization strategies of their audit part-
ners, they would likely be in a worse situation to compete in
terms of audit quality with Big 4 audit firms. At a more theor-
etical level, the results of this study also indicate that taking
into account the whole audit career of the individual auditor
seem to provide a more accurate indicator of his/her audit
expertise than just considering the level of specialization of
these auditors.
Even though this study is conducted with a sample of Span-
ish companies, following Chi et al. (2017) argument, our res-
ults might be of interest more broadly; not only because the
issues investigated here (audit quality and partner audit ex-
perience) are universal issues in the auditing literature, but
also because the structure of the audit market (i.e. strong con-
centration by Big 4 audit firms), the audit process and the use
of financial statements by market participants are similar in
Spain and in many developed and emerging countries (par-
ticularly in the context of comparisons with other EU coun-
tries).
The research presented in this study is subject to several
limitations. First, although the proxies employed to capture
the quality of audit services are consistent with the prior lit-
erature, they do not give us a detailed understanding about
the internal processes whichmake up an audit and the impact
this has on the quality of audit services. We acknowledge the
need to develop more accurate and specific indicators that
take into account the internal processes which occur within
the audit firm. Secondly, although we intended to collect in-
formation about partners’ entire careers as signing auditors,
data was only available from 1995 onwards. Therefore, any
audit experience of the individual auditor acquired before
this year has not been considered.
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